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LOOKING BACKWARDS AT OLD CASES:
WHEN SCIENCE MOVES FORWARD
JULES EPSTEIN*
Forensic evidence—be it in the form of science-derived analyses such
as DNA profiling or drug identification, or in more subjective analyses
such as pattern or impression [latent print, handwriting, firearms]
examinations—is prevalent and often critical in criminal prosecutions. Yet,
while the criminal court processes prize finality of verdicts, science evolves
and often proves that earlier analyses were inadequate or plainly wrong.
This article examines the tension between those two concerns by focusing
on the 2015 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v.
Kulbicki, addresses the inadequacies of the Court’s analysis, and suggests
some factors for judges confronted with changing science to weigh when
reviewing convictions where the forensic evidence was core to the
prosecution’s proof.
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INTRODUCTION
How should judges evaluate lawyers’ alleged mishandling of forensic
science evidence (forensic evidence) when the challenge is brought years
after the trial? One recent United States Supreme Court decision grapples
with this issue,1 and this article contextualizes that holding, analyzes its
weaknesses, and suggests some factors for judges to weigh.
In criminal cases, the importance of science (and understanding the
limits of science) cannot be gainsaid. The statistics are clear: in a review of
homicide cases in Cleveland, Ohio, the clearance rate2 was higher (63.1%)
for cases with probative results after collection of a variety of types of
forensic evidence—DNA, firearms evidence, fingerprints, etc.—than in
cases without such evidence (56.3%), and the average sentence imposed
was higher in the former category.3
Yet, there is a perplexing problem—the judges, prosecutors and
defense counsel who are consumers of forensic evidence have little or no
scientific training, either at the college level or on the job. Perhaps 5% of
lawyers (and judges) studied science, a number confirmed repeatedly by
polling attendees at legal education conferences. And the consequences
may be severe, because when lawyers do not understand science and its
limitations, they can neither assess, nor challenge the proof being presented
in court.
SCIENTIFIC ILLITERACY: A PROBLEM IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The scientific illiteracy of lawyers was highlighted in the 2009 Report
of the National Academy of Sciences, Strengthening Forensic Science: A
Path Forward, which concluded, “[t]he judicial system is encumbered by,
among other things, judges, and lawyers who generally lack the scientific
expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an
informed manner.”4
This was brought home directly in a recent judgment, overturning a

1

Maryland v. Kulbicki, 577 U.S. 1 (2015) (per curium).
The term “clearance rate” refers, in the law enforcement context, to arrest. FBI,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE U.S., 1 (2012), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances
(“In the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, law enforcement agencies can
clear, or ‘close,’ offenses in one of two ways: by arrest or by exceptional means.”).
3
Tom McEwen & Wendy Regoeczi, Forensic Evidence in Homicide Investigations and
Prosecutions, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1188, 1193 (2015).
4
COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. COMM., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI. IN THE U.S.: A PATH FORWARD 110 (2009).
2
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Pennsylvania capital conviction based on DNA evidence.5 As argued at
trial, “[t]hat hat that was left at the scene in the middle of the street has [the
defendant’s] sweat on it and has [the victim’s] blood on it . . . DNA is a
witness. It is a silent, unflappable witness.”6
There was only one problem—the blood was on the victim’s hat, not
the hat of the accused.7 The prosecutors misread the report and the defense
lawyers never caught the error.8 This was not the only science-related error
made at trial. The prosecutor also argued to the jury that, because the
defendant was the major contributor of the DNA on the hat, he was the
person who wore it most recently, a statement contrary to science.9 The
defense made no objection.10
It cannot be said that this is an isolated incident of scientific illiteracy
on the part of lawyers, although documenting instances is difficult because
it takes later scrutiny by courts or scientifically-knowledgeable lawyers to
uncover the phenomenon. But the concern over lawyers not knowing and
challenging science has been expressed for decades.11
The late Judge Louis Pollak acknowledged as much in 2002 when he
expressed concern over how a law-trained person could decide questions of
science:
The most important question here, of course, is, Am I the right person to be a
gatekeeper?” he said. “I, who know little of science. . . . As society comes to rely
more fully on technology, the question will become acute.” Pollak said that he found
it worrisome that the Supreme Court ruling in the Daubert case meant that he could
rule one way on an issue like fingerprints and another federal judge in a different
jurisdiction could do the opposite, and neither ruling would be reversed (the Court
5
See Claudia Vargas, Mistaken DNA Interpretation Sends Death-Row Case to Retrial,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Aug. 25, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-08-25/news/6581
2999_1_dna-evidence-dna-analysis-kareem-johnson.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Katie Stuhldreher, Guilty Verdict in Killing of Witness, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (June
26, 2007), http://articles.philly.com/2007-06-26/news/25235484_1_key-witness-johnson-sdna-first-degree-murder.
9
See, e.g., Corissa J. Harris et al., Comparing Wearer DNA Sample Collection Methods
for the Recovery of Single Source Profiles, 1 RES. J. JUST. STUD. & FORENSIC SCI. 81, 83
(2013) (“Often, the major contributor’s profile is that of the habitual wearer. A minor
contributor’s profile may be detected from those who have borrowed or most recently worn
the item of clothing.”).
10
See Stuhldreher, supra note 8.
11
Some commentators suggest that lawyers generally possess “an appalling degree of
scientific illiteracy, which ill equips them to educate and guide the bench.” ANDRE A.
MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 7 (3d ed., 1986) (discussing the
difficulties experienced by judges in determining the admissibility of expert evidence); see
also United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 90 (3d Cir. 1994).
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will hear appeals only on procedure, not on the law). He was frank about how poorly
prepared most judges are for making decisions based on scientific issues. 12

KULBICKI: THE LAWYER’S DUTY WHEN FACED WITH SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
With this background, one would hope that when confronted with a
claim that counsel erred by not researching the science being used against
his client, the United States Supreme Court would emphasize that the
lawyer’s first duty is to learn—ask questions, conduct basic research, and
consult with an expert before trial. But the exceptional deference13 paid to
lawyers’ judgment calls, especially when viewed through a retrospective
prism that emphasizes finality, dominated the Court’s analysis.
The case is Maryland v. Kulbicki,14 and its story is worth telling.
James Kulbicki, a police officer, had an extra-marital affair in which the
woman gave birth to a child.15 Kulbicki was subsequently the subject of a
paternity and child support action.16 In 1993, the woman was murdered by
a shot in the head.17 Two days later, when Kulbicki’s home and vehicles
were searched, a bullet fragment was found in his truck.18 Metallurgic
analysis of that fragment showed that it had the same elemental
composition as a bullet fragment found in the victim’s brain.19 This is
called Comparative Bullet-Lead Analysis (CBLA).20 This testimony was
scientifically based.
The problem came when FBI analyst Ernest Peele testified at the 1995
trial about the significance of this finding:
Peele testified that the bullet fragments from Gina’s brain and Kulbicki’s truck
exhibited “the same amounts of each and every element … detected,” and were thus
“analytically indistinguishable.” Peele added that the results were “what you’d expect
if you were examining two pieces of the same bullet, they are that close, two pieces of
the same source.”21

Time marched on, as does science, and CBLA evidence came to be
12
Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie?, THE NEW YORKER (May 27, 2002),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/05/27/do-fingerprints-lie.
13
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (“In Strickland we said that ‘[j]udicial
scrutiny of a counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.’”) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
14
Maryland v. Kulbicki, 577 U.S. 1 (2015) (per curium).
15
Id.; Kulbicki v. State, 99 A.3d 730, 744 (Md. Ct. App. 2014).
16
Kulbicki, 577 U.S. at 1.
17
Id.
18
Id.; see also Kulbicki v. State, 53 A.3d 361, 368 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012).
19
Kulbicki, 53 A.3d at 368.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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discredited in the decade after trial. The flaws in CBLA were substantial:
there was no scientific foundation for claims that the crime scene evidence
came from the same box as bullets found in a suspect’s possession or could
otherwise be related in time or geography.22 “[I]t remained in many cases a
distinct possibility that while bullets from the same “source” match each
other, they also match bullets from any number of “sources.”23
Kulbicki attacked his conviction in the Maryland state courts.24
Regarding the CBLA evidence, the claim was that of ineffective
representation by his trial lawyer, a denial of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to counsel in a criminal case.25 To prevail, he had to show both
that counsel performed in a deficient manner, i.e. “whether, in light of all
the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance”26 and that there was
“prejudice,” i.e. “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”27 The Court of Appeals of Maryland found both elements
proved28 and a new trial was ordered but the grant of certiorari led to a
reexamination of that holding.
Viewed through the lens of Strickland ineffectiveness analysis applied
by the United States Supreme Court, Kulbicki faced an uphill battle as he
was attacking his conviction more than a decade after CBLA evidence was
shown to be unreliable. He lost because the Court held that lawyers need
not be prescient nor predict future developments in forensic science.29 The
Court held that his lawyer was to be judged by what reasonable lawyers
would have done in 1995.30
And that is where the United States Supreme Court gave Kulbicki’s
lawyer—and all lawyers handling cases involving forensic science—an
unwarranted pass. The Maryland Court of Appeals decided that a new trial
22

Id. at 377 (citing COMM. ON SCI. ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL
COMPOSITION COMPARISON, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET
LEAD EVIDENCE 106–07 (2004) [hereinafter COMM. ON SCI. ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD
ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION COMPARISON]).
23
Id. (citing COMM. ON SCI. ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION
COMPARISON, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 106–07).
24
Kulbicki, 53 A.3d at 361.
25
A criminal defendant “shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
27
Id. at 694.
28
Kulbicki v. State, 99 A.3d 730, 743 (Md. Ct. App. 2014).
29
Maryland v. Kulbicki, 577 U.S. 1, 4 (2015) (per curium).
30
Id. at 3 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
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was appropriate because the lawyer never looked for, found, or read a 1991
report by Peele that contradicted, or at least called into question, Peele’s
fundamental claim at trial—that each batch of metal melted to create bullets
is compositionally unique.31 In his 1991 report, Peele found bullets
manufactured fifteen months apart to have an identical composition.32
The Maryland high court granted relief based on a simple articulation
of the duty of a lawyer—lawyers are effective only when they make
decisions based upon “adequate investigation” and the “[f]ailure to
investigate the forensic evidence is not what a competent lawyer would
do.”33
The United States Supreme Court responded in a per curiam decision
with no preceding oral argument. The Court misstated the Maryland
Court’s holding as constitutionally requiring Kulbicki’s defense attorneys to
“predict the demise of CBLA.”34 The Maryland court had no such premise;
rather, it focused on the duty of the lawyer to investigate science that comes
into the courtroom.35 In this mischaracterization, and in the remainder of
the opinion, the Court ignored the duty of lawyers to ask questions and
educate themselves.36
According to the Court, “[c]ounsel did not perform deficiently by
dedicating their time and focus to elements of the defense that did not
involve poking methodological holes in a then-uncontroversial mode of
ballistics analysis.”37 The Court concluded that because the trial predated
the search engines of the worldwide web, the Peele report would not have
been easily located.38 Restated, this seems to say: “If it looks good, don’t
bother to read up on it. And don’t ask for the expert’s curriculum vitae,
which would lead to the expert’s own research.”
KULBICKI’S CONSEQUENCE
The message of “you don’t have to ask questions if the science looks

31

Kulbicki, 99 A.3d at 735–36, 740.
Id. at 740.
33
Id. at 738 (quoting Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d. 734, 736 (Md. Ct. App. 1990)).
34
Kulbicki, 577 U.S. at 3 (emphasis added).
35
Kulbicki, 99 A.3d at 739 (“The failure, then, to appropriately investigate the State’s
forensic evidence and challenge the State’s expert on cross-examination regarding a
scientific method used to implicate the defendant may be a predicate upon which a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel may prevail.”).
36
See id. at 739–44.
37
Kulbicki, 577 U.S. at 4
38
Id.
32
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good at the time of trial” has already been echoed by one court.39 The
notion defies a basic precept of science, that “[w]e accumulate scientific
knowledge like clockwork, with the result that facts are overturned at
regular intervals in our quest to better understand the world.”40 In a world
where, over the past decade, we have seen the impact of flawed or
erroneous forensic evidence testimony,41 the lesson from the Court should
be simple and clear—a lawyer’s first duty in a case with scientific evidence
is to ask questions and learn its limitations.
Post-Kulbicki, how does a judge respond to new post-conviction
challenges that look back and say “the lawyer didn’t investigate the
science?” If the jurisdiction develops more stringent standards under its
own Constitution or statute, then Kulbicki is of no moment. But where the
jurisdiction applies federal law, a searching inquiry is still warranted. The
Supreme Court in Kulbicki emphasized that this trial was pre-internet,
describing the case as in “an era of card catalogues, not a worldwide web,”
where research was not as easy.42 And although unmentioned, in 1995, we
did not have the documented history of forensic errors and the awareness of
the limitations of many forensic disciplines that we have now.43
Additionally, grounds other than the Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel need to be explored in “bad” or questionable science
cases. Albeit a difficult standard to satisfy, a claim under the Due Process
guarantee may lie where the forensic evidence used at trial has been
subsequently shown to be invalid. This was accepted by the Third Circuit
in 2012 in a case involving fire causation where testimony from a 1990
arson-murder case was subsequently shown to be invalid: “[t]o succeed,
[petitioner] must show that the admission of the fire expert testimony
‘undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial,’44 because the
39
See Pulido v. Grounds, No. 2:13-cv-01814 TLN GGH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
141313, at *56–57 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2015).
40
SAMUEL ARBESMAN, THE HALF-LIFE OF FACTS: WHY EVERYTHING WE KNOW HAS AN
EXPIRATION DATE 7 (2012).
41
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009). As acknowledged by the United
States Supreme Court in another context, “[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the
forensic evidence used in criminal trials. One commentator asserts that ‘[t]he legal
community now concedes, with varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces
erroneous convictions based on discredited forensics.’” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (quoting Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 475, 491 (2006)).
42
Kulbicki, 577 U.S. at 4.
43
Id.
44
Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d
408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001)).
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probative value of [the fire expert] evidence, though relevant, is greatly
outweighed by the prejudice to the accused from its admission.”45
The second ground, independent of a claim of ineffective counsel, may
arise under a state statute or rule of procedure permitting claims of “bad” or
erroneous science, regardless of timing limitations. Massachusetts law, for
example, permits a claim to be filed “at any time . . . upon the ground that
the confinement or restraint was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States or of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.”46
That was extended to a “bad” science claim—hair comparison analysis—in
2016, on a case nearly a quarter of a century old.47
[T]he court determines that ‘justice may not have been done’ at Perrot's 1992 trial
because of the introduction of hair evidence that in numerous and material respects
exceeded the foundational science. In making that judgment, the court determines that
it was not until decades after Perrot's 1992 trial that errors in testimony on hair
evidence came to be authoritatively recognized and addressed.48

While the Massachusetts court applied a general post-conviction
provision to a claim of “bad” science, in Texas, there is a procedure specific
to such averments. Texas’ Code of Criminal Procedure includes a
provision titled Procedure Related to Certain Scientific Evidence, which
states in pertinent part that post-conviction relief may be granted where:
(A) relevant scientific evidence is currently available and was not available at the time
of the convicted person’s trial because the evidence was not ascertainable through the
exercise of reasonable diligence by the convicted person before the date of or during
the convicted person’s trial; and
(B) the scientific evidence would be admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence at
a trial held on the date of the application; and
(2) the court…finds that, had the scientific evidence been presented at trial, on the
preponderance of the evidence the person would not have been convicted.49

California, too, has such a provision. A challenge may be made when
a conviction is based on false evidence, where “false evidence shall include
opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who
originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been
undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.”50
45

Id. at 403 (quoting Bisaccia v. Attorney Gen., 623 F.2d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 1980)).
MASS. R. CIV. P. 30(a).
47
Commonwealth v. Perrot, 2016 Mass. Super. LEXIS 3, at *1–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan.
26, 2016).
48
Id. at *2.
49
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West 2015).
50
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1473(1) (West 2015). This provision was recently applied to
discredited “bitemark” evidence. See In re Richards, 63 Cal. 4th 291, 312–16 (Cal. 2016).
46
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CONCLUSION
Kulbicki could, but should not, be read as a barrier for correcting
convictions based on science later proved false or incomplete. Read
properly, it is a limited decision, one grounded in the particulars of Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine and in the specific
context of CBLA ‘science’ as it was viewed at the time of Kulbicki’s trial,
before the ubiquitousness of the internet and the recognition that forensic
science claims of exactitude warrant scrutiny, if not skepticism.
After Kulbicki, a number of options must be explored beyond that of
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to address questionable science
used to support a criminal conviction. And even under the Sixth
Amendment ineffectiveness rubric, as time and knowledge evolve, it may
be that even when we apply what that Court called the “rule of
contemporary assessment of counsel’s conduct,”51 i.e. judging
reasonableness as of the time of counsel’s conduct, there may be good
grounds to apply the standard the Maryland Court did—that “failure to
investigate the forensic evidence is not what a competent lawyer would
do.”52

51

Maryland v. Kulbicki, 577 U.S. 1, 3 (2015) (per curium) (quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U. S. 364, 372 (1993)).
52
Kulbicki v. State, 99 A.3d 730, 738 (Md. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Bowers v. State, 578
A.2d. 734, 743 (Md. Ct. App. 1990)).
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